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Family, Phenomenology and Schizophrenia in R.D. Laing1
DANIEL BURSTON

 

Though Laing did not say so here, the fact that methodological controversies still bedevil the field is neither surprising nor cause for reproach. There are few fields where complete clarity and a calm, unbroken consensus regarding methodology prevails for long, even in the natural sciences. On the contrary, progress depends on them. Moreover, it is interesting to note that Sartre was quite impressed with Laing's efforts. In a letter to Laing, dated Nov. 9, 1963, he wrote

"... one cannot understand psychological disturbances from the outside, on the basis of a positivistic determinism, or reconstruct them with a combination of concepts that remain outside the illness as lived and experienced... one cannot study, let alone cure, a neurosis without a fundamental respect for the person of the patient, without a constant effort to grasp the basic situation and relive it ...I regard mental illness as the way out that the free organism... invents...to live through an intolerable situation. For this reason, I place the highest value on your researches, in particular on the study of the family..." (in Laing & Cooper, 1964).

In due course, Sartre would employ a very similar approach in his study of Gustav Flaubert, albeit with a much more Marxist emphasis. Indeed, during the late sixties, while Sartre's Marxism was intensifying, Laing's was rapidly evaporating (Kirsner, 1976). Another notable disjuncture between Laing and Sartre was their attitudes toward psychoanalysis. Being and Nothingness proscribes the invocation of "the unconscious" to explain behavior which is the result of self-deception or "bad faith" (Sartre, 1941), and there is no evidence that Sartre ever wavered on this point, despite many other changes and shifts in emphasis (Kirsner, 1976). Despite his homage to Sartre, Laing wavered on this point somewhat. Indeed, in the Introduction to Reason and Violence: A Decade of Sartre's Philosophy -- which he co-authored with David Cooper -- Laing remarked

There is plenty of room for a phenomenological investigation of 'unconscious phantasy', in so far as the latter is conceived in its reality as experience and not as a series of mechanisms to be imposed on a subject objectified in the psychoanalytic situation.

This is a remarkable statement, if you consider that this same year, in Sanity, Madness and the Family, Laing declared "the unconscious" is completely off limits to phenomenological research. In Reason and Violence, by contrast, it is kosher, or could be, at any rate, subject to certain conditions. At issue here is a tension between a predominantly Husserlian and/or Sartrean version of phenomenology, where unconscious processes are deemed worthless (or worse), and one more akin to the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who goes curiously unacknowledged here.

Why was Merleau-Ponty slighted? In all probability, Laing never accorded Merleau-Ponty's work the attention it deserved because of the personal and political tensions that estranged Sartre from Merleau-Ponty in the mid-1950's. Praising Merleau-Ponty in a book devoted to celebrating Sartre's genius would have given offense, and Laing probably preferred tact to perfect honesty in this instance.

In any case, Laing was not really Sartrean in his views on psychoanalysis. Even when he proscribed the invocation of unconscious mental processes on methodological grounds, he granted its existence, and its central role in human affairs. In Sanity, Madness and the Family, for example, Laing cautioned that his findings are presented with a minimum of interpretation, because psychoanalysts make inferences and attributions about motives, meanings and defenses that shape behavior but which the subjects of such analysis frequently disavow. By adhering solely to ideas, motives and experiences that family members freely concede, he avoided potentially intractable issues of validation. Nevertheless, he noted, researchers could not possibly deal with an issue like sexuality in these families "unless they were willing to attribute to the agents involved fantasies of which they themselves are unconscious" (p.26). As a result, he said, "the reader will find documented the quite manifest contradictions that beset these families, without very much exploration of the underlying factors which may be supposed to generate and maintain them" (ibid.)

These caveats are striking. In Sanity, Madness & The Family, Laing eschewed all conjecture about allegedly unconscious motives, meanings, but conceded that phenomenological method, thus construed, has limitations. Indeed, he said he hoped to return to these cases to offer a psychodynamic perspective. Unfortunately, he never did. But that same year, in Reason and Violence, Laing declared unconscious phantasy a legitimate domain for phenomenological inquiry -- in a book on Sartre, no less.

Still, while convinced of the importance of the unconscious, Laing did not reduce all family dramas to a single, Oedipal formula. On the contrary, in The Politics of the Family, published in 1972, he insisted that every case is unique, and that the purpose of research is not to confirm or augment a theoretical preconception, but to discover "what is actually the case". To discover what is actually going on in families, Laing differentiated between the actual, empirical family, and the collective image or fantasy of the family internalized by its members, called the 'family'. The 'family' is subject to idealization and distortion, and is roughly equivalent to what other family therapists term ' the family myth'. Laing felt that getting the 'family' out of your system is an integral part of psychotherapy for almost any disturbed patient, no matter what their diagnostic profile might be. Unlike David Cooper, Laing was not calling for the abolition of the family per se. But if this process precipitates the loss of illusions, or creates greater emotional and/or geographical distance between the patient and his family, so be it.

Having said that, Laing also emphasized that the 'family' is not only internalized by introjection and identification, as psychoanalysis insists. In analytic lore, the terms introjection and identification describe the psychic assimilation of individual traits that are experienced, idealized, envied and/or feared in the other -- usually a parent. Laing insisted that the 'family' does not merely consist of internal representations of parents, but of siblings and extended family members in convergent and conflicting patterns of relationship -- patterns that are experienced and suffered passively, at first, but are later enacted in the bodily symptoms, mood swings and incessant preoccupations of the patient. Here is a relatively transparent example.

A young man feels his life has come to a stop. He is preoccupied by the conflict between East and West, the cold war, the balance of terror, techniques of deterence, one world, the impossibility of divorce, the need for co-existence, the apparent impossibility of co-existence. He has a mission to find a solution, but he feels hopeless, and paralysed. he does nothing, but feels crushed by his responsibility for the destruction he feels is inevitable.

The structural elements of his preoccupations -- conflict, the cold war, emotional divorce, balance of terror, need for coexistence -- resemble those in the relationship between his parents.

But he does not see those resemblances. He insists that his preoccupation with the world situation is not only entirely justified by the objective facts but entirely based on them. The world situation is a fact and thousands of people come from families like his, therefore there is no connection (Laing, 1971, pp.8-9).

There is nothing in this clinical portrait to dismay a psychoanalyst. Though troubled, this patient is idealistic, well read, articulate -- in short, "high functioning". His concerns about the arms race presumably represent the projection of intrapsychic "contents" derived from the "cold war" between his parents, which he suffered in childhood, and which may persist, in attenuated form, till today. Despite a pervasive depressive theme, and intermittent episodes of mild panic, helplessness, hopelessness, etc., there is no evidence of regression or paranoia, and the congruence between his unconscious representations and the pattern of world events is so close that he must be quite intelligent. His "ego" is relatively intact, and possibly much better than average in certain respects. A good candidate for treatment, evidently. The question then emerges -- which world power represents the mother, and which the father? Which does he fear most? And in the event of a serious conflict, to whom does he give his primary allegiance -- mother Russia, or Uncle Sam? (Probably the old Oedipus at the root of it all.)

But suppose this patient -- call him Edward -- who impressed us with his moral earnestness and diligent command of facts suddenly claims that he , and he alone, has the formula for world peace: that unbeknownst to their own governments, rogue elements of the CIA and KGB have developed a plot to discredit, persecute and kill him, if need be. These delusions -- of grandeur, persecution, reference, and so on -- will probably be attributed to a failure of reality testing occasioned by regression to a pre-Oedipal level. The presumption now is that Edward's phantasies and projections are more pathological, more distorted and more "primitive", due to impaired ego functioning. Right?

Wrong, said Laing. Laing usually regarded unconscious fantasy as an alienated appreception of features of interpersonal experience deemed invalid by others, rather than of "intrapsychic conflict". Even in psychotic individuals, Laing linked phantasy to the texture of lived experience -- experience lost to consciousness because of the conjoint effects of mystification, invalidation, injunctions and attributions, rules and meta-rules, which reverberate through the whole family system (Laing, 1971). Undoubtedly, as Freud and his followers insisted, mother and father are the principle figures in these family romances. But aunts, uncles, siblings and cousins are also frequently involved. In Edward's case, for example, the rogue elements of the CIA and KGB might represent his parents' parents, or their siblings, or others with power and influence in the extended family who prefer that the marital couple remain estranged, and do not reconcile, but who keep their intentions concealed, even from themselves, in order to succeed.

In any case, the point is that in Laing's able hands, patients' phantasies acquired an uncanny degree of intelligibility in light of their parents phantasies about them, and indeed, their own parents -- the patient's grandparents (or the like). So if, on inquiry, a parent insisted that his or her disturbed child "takes after" their own mother or father, grandmother or father, great aunt or uncle, etc., it often transpired that the patient had been scripted -- or perhaps, unwittingly conscripted -- into the performance of roles in an intergenerational drama of unknown age and provenance. To keep a drama this complex going , the various participants have to internalize more than mere imagos of their significant others: they have to internalize the rules regulating the commerce and conflicts between them all, and induce others, usually children or spouses, to embrace and embody the characteristic attitudes and behavior of people they have frequently never even met. To try and reduce the complex interpersonal and multi-generational processes involved here to a single, Oedpial plot-line would be manifestly absurd.

But Laing did not break with Freud entirely. The function of family research, said Laing, is to determine "what actually is the case", i.e. what is really going on in the family. Granted, this kind of clarity is not always possible, due to scarcity of time and reliable information, and the density and opacity of the knotted passions and unconscious agendas of various family members. Even so, Laing's belief that, in principle, the researcher could differentiate between truth and fiction, between the family and the 'family', is at variance with constructivist, hermeneutic and narrative-based theories of therapy which contend that there is no way to reliably ascertain what "really" happened, or indeed, what is happening right now. By these accounts, no amount of sifting factual information, of disentangling assertions about events and experiences of various family members, of recombining or "totalizing" partial perspectives, will ever yield "the truth". It only generates another narrative -- one that may (or may not) have healing properties for those concerned.

Laing, by contrast, continued to believe in the disillusioning function of therapy as understood by Freud -- that the only sure way to rid oneself of psychic suffering is to divest oneself of illusions. There is thus a profound tension between the critical and realist elements of Laingian theory and therapy, and the more constructivist and postmodern features encountered along the way.

Laing never acknowledged, never mind addressed these epistemological issues directly. But the most puzzling thing about his work with families nowadays is how widely discredited his ideas are, and how little reflection is devoted to revisiting, revising and updating his methodology. Most family therapists cannot be bothered because it is too labor-intensive, and because they lack the time and the practical incentive to elucidate the processes of collusion, mystification, reification, invalidation (and so on), that Laing deftly brought to light. They may be aware of their existence, but whether from preference or necessity in the present clinical climate, focus chiefly on the present in time-limited clinical encounters. And though they never say so, of course, Laing's nominalist critique of organicist and mechanistic metaphors, rooted in Sartre's anti-essentialism, would be bad for morale, and perhaps bad for business, if taken too seriously. After all, if "family pathology" is merely a metaphor to describe a particularly vicious form of human entanglement, why bother training and credentialing people to "treat" it?

Actually, I can think of several good reasons why people should be trained to work with families, even if we abjure the medical model completely. And in fairness to all concerned , Laing could too. The problem now is that family research carried out under the auspices of the medical model has completely usurped our attention. Mainstream methodologies devoted to studying the families of schizophrenics ask fundamentally different questions, and pursue different objectives, than Laing and his colleagues did (e.g. Leff & Vaughn, 1985; Fort, 1990). Not that the recent interest in the impact of "expressed emotion" on recividism rates necessarily lack merit, or are invalid as a consequence. But these studies are all based on the a priori assumption that "schizophrenia" is a neurophysiological disorder, and that disturbances in the family are the result of disturbed brain chemistry, in the first instance, and never vice versa. Laing had the courage to suggest that certain neurological disorders ae caused by disturbances in the family, rather than the other way around, and his theory has yet to be addressed cogently, never mind tested empirically, by the current crop of researchers. When all is said and done, their studies are just not equipped to address the questions Laing raised, and to offer either credible support or a compelling refutation of his work on the role of invalidation, mystification, collusion and other "interpersonal defenses" in the troubled family milieu. Perhaps one day things will change, and we'll all have another look.

 

References

Bateson, G., Jackson, D., Haley, J. & Weakland, J., 1968. "Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia" in Jackson, D.,1968. ed. Communication, Family & Marriage. Palo Alto: Science and Behavior Books.

Binswanger, L. 1963. Being in The World: Selected Papers of Ludwig Binswanger, New York: Basic Books.

Burston, D. 1996. The Wing of Madness: The Life and Work of R.D.Laing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Burston, D. in press. The Crucible of Experience: R.D. Laing and the Crisis of Psychotherapy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Cooper, D. 1971. The Death of the Family. New York: Vintage Books.

Dilthey, W. 1989. R. Makkreel and F. Rodi, eds. Introduction to the Human Sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fort, D. C. 1990. "Parent-Child Effects on Performance, Thinking and Communication in Families of Normal and Schizophrenic Sons". The Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis. 18, 1, 73-98.

Goffman, I. 1961. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Asylum Patients and Other Inmates. Chicago: Aldine.

Husserl, E., 1934. Cartesian Meditations.

Husserl, E., 1939. The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. trans D. Carr, Evanston:Northwestern University Press, 1964.

Jaspers, Karl, 1913, General Psychopathology. Reprinted University of Chicago Press.

Kirsner, D. 1976. The Schizoid World of Jean-Paul Sartre and R.D. Laing. Brisbane: University of Queensland Press.

Laing, R.D. 1960. The Divided Self. London: Tavistock Publications. Harmondsworth: Pegnuin, 1990.

Laing, R.D. 1961. Self and Others. London: Tavistock Publications. Harmondsworth: Pegnuin, 1990.

Laing, R.D. 1964a. "Review of General Psychopathology by Karl Jaspers. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 45.4

Laing, R.D. & Cooper, D. 1964b. Reason & Violence: A Decade of Sartre's Philosophy. New York: Pantheon.

Laing, R.D. & Esterson, A. 1964c. Sanity, Madness & The Family. London: Tavistock Publications: Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990.

Laing, R.D. 1967 The Politics of Experience and The Bird of Paradise. New York: Pantheon.

Laing, R.D. 1972. The Politics of the Family and Other Essays. New York: Vintage Books.

Laing, R.D. 1987. "Laing's Understanding of Interpersonal Experience". The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leff, J. & Vaughn, C. 1985. Expressed Emotion in Families. New York: Guilford Press.

Poster, M. 1980. Critical Theory of the Family. Boston: Beacon Books.

Sartre, J-P., 1941. Being and Nothingness. tr. Hazel Barnes.
New York: Washington Square Books.

Simon, R., 1983. "Still R.D.Laing after all These Years". Family Therapy Networker, 7.3.


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"Families, Phenomenology & Schizophrenia in
R.D.Laing", Nov. 3, 1998.
Center for the Philosophy of Science
817 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh


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